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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between CEO compensation and disclosure policy 
related to corporate governance information within S&P 500 index. Our sample consists of 456 
companies for the period from 2005 to 2015. Most previous researchers mainly put their attention 
on various corporate governance characteristics such as board size, board independence, and 
executive ownership when analysing CEO compensation. Our paper extends the previous study 
by dividing corporate governance into two aspects: governance transparency and governance 
characteristics. We find a significant relationship between CEO total compensation and 
governance transparency. In addition, a significant positive relationship exists between CEO 
salary and governance transparency with year and industry fixed effect. The higher transparency, 
the less option compensation the CEO receives. As for governance characteristic measure, we 
choose CEO ownership and board independence as independent variables. We find that more 
CEO ownership leads to less total compensation, salary, and more option awards. However, no 
significant evidence shows the impact of board independence.  The results show that governance 
with higher transparency can serve as an alternative mechanism for pay-for-performance. When 
governance transparency is relatively high, the board is able to monitor the CEO better and hence 
is able to tilt the compensation towards fixed-salary and less pay-for-performance. 
Keywords: CEO compensation; corporate governance; governance transparency; CEO 
ownership; board independence; S&P 500  
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1:  Introduction 
With increasing transparency in executive compensation disclosure, one particular 
question that has attracted both academic and media attention is the sharp increase in CEO 
compensation, especially compared to the average level of compensation enjoyed by employees. 
CEO-to-worker compensation ratio was 20 to 1 in 1965, and raised to 303 to 1 in 2014; Inflation 
adjusted CEO compensation increased 997 percent from 1978 to 2014, the increase almost double 
stock market growth in same period and dramatic if compared to the 11 percent growth of a 
typical worker’s compensation. Also, during the 2008 financial crisis, many executives received 
the huge amount of salaries even though their companies were in deep trouble and struggling to 
avoid bankruptcy. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been promoting 
transparency since 2013.  
 
Conyon and He (2012) address how the quality of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms would influence intensity of incentive compensation. Agency theory is based on the 
fact that the objective of the principal and the agent are at conflict at times. Berle and Means 
(1932) describe the agency problem of separation of control and ownership, Smith (1937) 
document a caustic remark about the agency problem as the core problem faced by modern 
companies. Agency conflict is commonly suggested as a major determinant of compensation. 
Corporate governance mechanisms could effectively reduce the conflicts between shareholders 
and executives and therefore influence the compensation policy. Yoshikawa and Phan (2001) 
argue that lower cost margins brought by global competition and rapid technological innovations 
have forced companies to maximize shareholder value and use their asset effectively. Bencht et al. 
(2002) document the growth of private savings, deregulation of capital market, worldwide 
privatization trend together with 1997 East Asia crisis and U.S. corporate scandals have risen the 
prominent of corporate governance. Furthermore, corporate governance has been refocused as a 
method of increasing accountability and transparency on CEO compensation. For example, The 
Dodd-Frank Act provided investors with ‘say-on-pay’ opportunity to vote for CEO pay. 
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Besides board structure and ownership structure which are regarded as important 
monitoring mechanism of managerial behavior, transparency that reflects the openness and 
willingness of managers to provide clear information to shareholders and other stakeholders is 
also essential.  In this paper, we investigate how corporate governance transparency and other 
governance characteristics such as CEO ownership and board independence are correlated with 
CEO compensation in public listed firms by using panel data of companies in S&P 500 from 
2005 to 2015. CEO compensation packages are mostly designed to motivate CEO to make 
decisions aligned with shareholders’ objective. Option-based compensation can reduce agency 
cost. In order to analyse fixed portion and pay-for-performance of executive compensation on 
governance, we consider the major components such as salary and option awards when measuring 
CEO compensation.  
 
Our main findings show that higher governance transparency is correlated with higher 
CEO salary and total compensation. Furthermore, we find that proportion of share owned by 
executive officer is negatively correlated with total CEO compensation. We also find that higher 
CEO ownership is negatively correlated with salary pay, but is positively correlated with option 
compensation, which in turn may lead to their increased ownership in the company. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 reviews the previous 
literature on the influence of governance transparency, relation between CEO ownership and 
CEO pay, as well as board composition and CEO compensation. Section 3 describes the sample 
and variables which have been used. The research method and empirical results are discussed in 
Section 4. Section 5 gives conclusions of our work. 
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2: Literature Review 
For modern corporations, corporate governance is essential. It describes the processes 
and policies of how corporations monitor and administer their behaviour. Good governance is 
important for a company’s reputation because potential investors want to know that their 
investments are preserved adequately and not subject to agency conflicts.  
 
There have been claims that corporate governance variables such as CEO ownership and 
board composition are important in shaping CEO compensation. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argue that high level of CEO’s share ownership would lead to lower demand for compensation in 
the form of pay-for-performance. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) show that managers who are 
majority shareholders in publicly traded firms are likely to receive marginally higher level of 
salaries than other officers. Thus CEOs holding a high percentage of their company’s equity 
would possibly result in over-concentrated power for executive officer and a high potential for 
increasing their own compensation. Allen (1981), however, provides evidence that CEO pay is 
negatively related to shares held by CEO. Consistent with Allen’s (1981) finding, Lambert et al. 
(1993) discover that if there is an internal member on the board (who is not a CEO) who holds a 
minimum of 5% of shares, CEO compensation is a decreasing function of CEO ownership. Core 
(1997), by analysing Canadian firms, point out that CEO pay tend to decrease when inside 
directors’ ownership increase. More recently, using a sample of Hong Kong companies, Cheung 
et al. (2005) find that CEOs with large proportion of share ownership are likely to supplement 
their cash compensation with dividend income if those are considerably higher than cash pay 
received. 
 
The board of directors is regarded as essential in monitoring management and is 
responsible for evaluating management as well as managers’ performance. However, previous 
studies have pointed out that outside directors who are not fully employed by the company are 
likely to play a relatively larger role in monitoring corporate behaviour. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
argue that inside directors have less incentive to provide an effective monitoring process. While 
outside directors, are likely to be more objective compared with inside directors and normally act 
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with more incentive to ensure the effective operation and prove their capability to the market. 
Williamson (1985) suggests that the lack of independent remuneration committees would likely 
lead to executives signing on the contract written by themselves. Closely tied their career 
concerns CEO, inside directors would be unwilling to take positions that challenge CEO as 
reported by Crystal (1991) and Ozkan (2007). Relying just on executive directors may lead to 
compensation contracts optimized for CEO but not the company, thus increasing the effectiveness 
of board of directors is vital. Jensen (1993) argue that a board with high percentage of insiders is 
considered to be weak in governance and except CEO, all board members should be hired from 
outside of the firm.  
 
The findings are mixed on relation between board independence and CEO pay according 
to a large number of prior studies. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find out non-executive 
directors have less influence on determining CEO pay. Thus, monitoring benefits provided by 
non-executive directors to other shareholders may facilitate incentive compensation. These 
directors can influence the corporate governance policies as members of compensation 
committees. Lambert et al. (1991) concludes that the percentage of board composed with non-
executive directors (outside directors) is positively related to CEO compensation. Sapp (2008) 
documents that an increase in the number of independent members on the compensation 
committee is likely to reveal a higher CEO pay. Similarly, Ozkan (2011) notice a positive relation 
between CEO compensation and the proportion of outside directors on the board. However, 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) report unrelated considering percentage of non-executive 
directors on board and CEO compensation. 
 
Most corporate governance papers have been focusing on the impact of governance 
mechanism on financial performance and market valuation. Klapper and Love (2004) found that 
better governance is highly correlated with better-operating performance and market valuation. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) argued that increase in governance transparency can be associated 
with both costs and benefits, and eventually will lead to an optimum level where more 
transparency will lower profits. The better transparency enables the public to learn more about the 
CEO which will increase the risk associated with CEO’s wrongdoings. Their study also shows 
that executives could have incentives to increase transparency due to career concerns. However, 
there are very few studies that examine CEO compensation and governance information 
disclosure. Craighead, Magnan, and Thorne (2004) find that CEO performance-contingent cash 
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compensation increases more in widely held firms than closely held firms when mandated 
disclosure is implemented. Eng and Mak (2003) discover that ownership structure and board 
composition can affect disclosure. Increased disclosure is related to less managerial ownership 
and more government ownership. More outside directions will lead to less corporate transparency. 
Mas (2016) find the pay disclosure did not achieve the intended effect which is broadly lowering 
CEO compensation. He analysed the change of executive compensation during the Great 
Depression, before and after mandated pay disclosure in 1934.  
 
Given the mixed nature of previous empirical results, the impact of corporate governance 
transparency as well as board independence and CEO ownership on CEO compensation remain 
ambiguous.  The aim of our study is to investigate the relation between variables mentioned 
above.  
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3: Data and Measurement 
The data consists of a sample of 457 traded companies from 2005 to 2015 with a total of 
3763 firm-year observations of S&P 500 firms. 59 industries are covered by our sample data. We 
drop off the unqualified firm-year data containing one or more empty variable values.  
 
We use Governance Disclosure Score as the transparency measure, obtained from 
Bloomberg environmental, social, and governance (ESG) function platform, which includes over 
11,300 public traded companies around the world. More than 35 analysts are working for 
Bloomberg's ESG team to collect, classify information and help users to integrate ESG criteria in 
their portfolio management. The data source of ESG includes the annual report, sustainability 
reports, press releases and third-party research. All data available is gathered from the company 
public document. The higher score implies a better transparency and companies are actively 
involved in improving their scores for the various metrics (for example, reducing GHC 
emissions). Governance Disclosure Score measures the degree of transparency on governance 
matrix. The detailed definition as follows: 
 
Proprietary Bloomberg score based on the extent of a company's governance disclosure 
as part of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) data. The score ranges from 0.1 for 
companies that disclose minimum amount of governance data to 100 for those that disclose every 
data point collected by Bloomberg. Each data point is weighted in terms of importance, with 
board of director’s data carrying greater weight than other disclosures. The score is also tailored 
to different industry sectors. In this way, each company is only evaluated in terms of the data that 
is relevant to its industry sector. (Bloomberg, GOVERNANCE_DISCLOSURE_SCORE) 
 
Only a small number of published researches use Bloomberg ESG disclosure score as the 
data source. Mark and Cheung (2010) used ESG score to explore the relationship between CSR 
disclosure and firm financial performance of international commercial banks in European and 
North American countries. They conclude that ESG disclosure has no significant impact on ROA, 
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ROE, and market return. Percentage of the independent director on Board is also based on 
Bloomberg database. 
 
The Dependent variable that we use to measure CEO Compensation comes from 
ExecuComp and firm performance data comes from CRSP and Compustat database from 2005 to 
2016. WRDS is the most widely used data research platform and business intelligence tool for 
corporate, academic, governments. We used three different measures of CEO compensation: 
Total compensation, salary and option award. Our research focuses on the impact of corporate 
governance on CEO compensation. Total compensation data is Execucomp item.  We concern 
ourselves with only compensation of the CEO. TDC1 is the sum of Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, 
Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted (using Black-
Scholes), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total. Option awards are fair value of all 
options awarded during the year. Valuation is based upon the grant-date fair value as detailed in 
FAS 123R.We find that all three compensation measures are positively skewed. In order to 
reduce heteroscedasticity, the natural log of compensation is used. We also construct several firm 
performance control variables including the market value of equity, annual stock return, and 
market to book ratio using WRDS database platform. When calculating stock annual return, we 
used monthly holding period return from CRSP, and the annualized through compounding over a 
calendar year. Nature log of annual return is used since it is positively skewed. Market to Book 
ratio is calculated as market value of equity divided by (Book value per share * Outstanding 
shares). Company SIC code (standard industrial classification code) is also used in order to 
control for industry fixed effect (using two digit SIC code). The detailed data source can be found 
in Table 1. We winsorized market to book at 1% and 99% percentile.  
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4: Methodology and Empirical Results 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on various governance measurements, 
compensation and firm performance for the year from 2005 to 2016. The average CEO total 
compensation in our sample is $10.82 million, with a standard deviation of $8.96 million. The 
minimum total compensation is $1, which comes from Apple, Google, Yahoo and Kinder Morgan 
Inc. because their CEOs including Steve Jobs, Eric Schmidt, Terry Semel and Richard Kinder 
decided to take only $1 compensation. The highest compensation is $156 million on 2014 for 
company Discovery Communication Inc. Option awards is a larger portion of total compensation 
compared to salary. The range of disclosure score is from 37.5 to 85.7 with average 56.37. As for 
the performance measure, the mean stock annual return is 7.84% while the mean of the market 
value of equity is $30.2 billion.  
4.2 Pearson Correlation Analysis 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation for various governance measures, CEO 
compensation, and control variables. We notice that Governance Disclosure Score is significant 
and positively correlated with all three compensation dependent variables. In order to get whether 
there is truly a positive correlation between governance and compensation, multivariate tests are 
required. Board independent is positively related to total compensation and salary. In addition, the 
correlation between market value and governance score is 0.3897 which means larger firms tend 
to have higher Governance Disclosure Score. The correlation between total assets and governance 
is 0.4071 also support this conclusion. Furthermore, the market value of equity is significantly 
positively related to total compensation at 1% level. There is a negative relationship between 
CEO ownership and total compensation and salary at 1% significant level. Since total assets and 
market value is extremely highly correlated (coefficient is 0.7153), we decided to use only market 
value as our measure for firm size in our regression analysis.  
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4.3 Difference Test Based on the Level of Governance Score 
Table 4 represents the results of difference test. In order to analyse the potential impact of 
governance on CEO compensation, we compare the mean differences of different variables based 
on the level of governance score. We define the firms with above median governance score as 
High Governance Transparency and below median governance score as Low Transparency. Table 
4 summarized our results. Based on the p-value, we can conclude that there is a significant mean 
difference for dependent variables total compensation and salary. As for the control variables, 
stock annual return and market value for High and Low Transparency are significant. Firms with 
above median Governance Disclosure Scores are usually large firms which have high market 
value of total assets.  
 
4.4 Regression Analysis 
The regression results are summarized in Table 5.In order to study the influence of 
corporate governance on CEO compensation, we construct two cross-sectional ordinary least-
square (OLS) regression models. Model 1 uses Governance Disclosure Score as the independent 
variable which can help us explore the impact of governance transparency. Model 2 uses board 
independence and CEO ownership which are two specific governance characteristics as 
independent variables that might affect CEO compensation. Both models are control for firm 
performance variables including the market value of equity, annual return, and market to book 
ratio. We use 2 digits SIC code as the indictor for industry effects, and then cluster observations 
at the company level. Year effects are also controlled. Following the previous literatures, lagged 
governance score variable and control variables are also used.  
 
Compared to the previous correlation matrix, some significant relationships disappear. In 
column 1, Governance Disclosure Score has a positive coefficient 0.014 with total compensation 
at 5% level, with p value being 0.016. We also find that higher governance transparency leads to 
higher salary and lower option awards. One unit governance score increase can increase log 
salary by 1.9% at 1% significant level and reduce log option awards by 0.8% at 10% significant 
level. This result is consistent with Schmidt’s (2012) finding that enhanced disclosure can lead to 
higher compensation levels. In his research, he used wage as dependent variables. Moving to 
model 2, board independence does not have a significant impact on all three compensation 
  10 
measures. The coefficient of CEO ownership in the total compensation (salary) specifications is -
0.07 (-0.17), which means the more shares CEO is holding, the less total salary and total 
compensation he or she will get. Based on this significant result, we think CEO ownership can be 
a good indicator when analysing the level of CEO salary. In addition, higher option awards are 
positively correlated with CEO ownership with coefficient being 0.067. Move to control variables, 
the market value of equity and option award are positively related with coefficient being 0.419 in 
model 1 and 0.399 in model 2. Higher annual return leads to high option award for both models 
as well. Market to book ratio is positively correlated with option award but have no significant 
impact on total compensation and salary. 
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5: Conclusion 
Past researches have addressed the important connection between corporate governance 
and CEO compensation. Our paper examines the impact of corporate governance from both the 
transparency and characteristic prospective. Based on the result, we find that higher governance 
transparency have a significant positive relationship with total CEO compensation. Furthermore, 
better disclosure leads to higher salary and lower option award based on our sample. Board 
independence, one specific governance component, has no impact on compensation measures in 
our sample. In addition, the more shares CEO owns, the less total compensation and salary he or 
she will get even though the performance pay which is measured by option award will increase. 
In conclusion, the level of governance transparency can affect how CEO compensation is 
structured. Governance with high transparency tends to set higher total compensation for CEO 
with higher fixed portion and less performance pay portion, because the board may believe that 
they can set the salary accurately and they rely less on the performance related compensation.   
 
Some limitations exist in our research. First, the sample size may be not sufficient for the 
regression model. A better result can be achieved by including more companies. Furthermore, 
some other variables may influence the compensation structure.  
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Appendices 
Table 1 Variables Definitions and Source 
Variable Definitions Data Source 
Governance Measure 
 
 
Governance Score 
The Governance Score is based on the company's annual disclosure of various metrics in its 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Report. 
Bloomberg 
Board Independence Percentage of independent directors on board Bloomberg 
CEO Ownership 
Total Shares owned by the CEO, including options that are exercisable or will become exercisable 
within 60 days. (SHROWN_TOT) 
ExecuComp 
  
 
CEO Compensation Measure 
 
 
Total Compensation 
Total compensation comprised of the following: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of 
Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted (using Black-Scholes), Long-
Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total. (TDC1, in thousands) 
ExecuComp 
Salary 
The dollar value of the base salary earned by the CEO during the fiscal year. (SALARY, in 
thousands) 
ExecuComp 
Option Awards Grant Date Fair Value of Options Granted (OPTION_AWARDS_FV, In thousands) ExecuComp 
  
 
Performance Measure 
 
 
Stock Annual Return 
The total annualized value of an investment in a common stock per dollar of initial 
investment.(based on Monthly RET) 
CRSP 
Market Value of Equity 
Sum of all issue-level market values, including trading and non-trading issues. (MKVALT, in 
millions) 
Compustat 
Market to Book Market value of equity over book value of equity. (BKVLPS, CSHO, MKVALT) Compustat 
Total Assets Book value of total assets. (AT) Compustat 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
N Mean Median SD Min Max 25 Percentile 75 percentile 
Total Compensation ($thousands) 3763 10816.140 8723.001 8963.868 0.001 156077.900 5927.620 13136.840 
Salary ($thousands) 3763 1103.559 1035.000 470.231 0.000 5600.000 885.403 1255.000 
Option Awards ($thousands) 3763 2380.784 1346.941 5015.586 0.000 90845.600 0.000 3100.886 
Governance Score 3763 56.372 55.357 6.349 37.500 85.714 51.786 60.714 
Board Independence (%) 3763 83.480 87.500 9.417 23.077 100.000 77.780 90.909 
CEO Ownership (%) 3763 1.013 0.152 3.200 0.000 30.100 0.023 0.548 
Stock Annual Return (%) 3763 7.841 6.856 4.187 1.734 52.705 4.988 9.496 
Market Value of Equity ($millions) 3763 30239.040 13406.290 51411.610 648.052 626550.400 7155.990 28591.140 
Market to Book 3763 3.618 2.713 4.770 -16.627 30.079 1.686 4.388 
Total Assets ($millions) 3763 52457.740 13905.000 186523.700 390.613 2573126.000 5661.000 34859.000 
Note: Table 2 provides the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, top quarter and bottom quarter summary statistics for 3763 
firm-year observations from 2005 to 2015.   
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Table 3 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Log (Total Compensation) 1 
        
 
2 Log (Salary) 0.6046*** 1 
       
 
3 Log (Option Awards) 0.6507*** 0.025 1 
      
 
4 Governance Score 0.1436*** 0.1077*** 0.0453** 1 
     
 
5 Board Independence 0.0969*** 0.1075*** -0.0058 0.2153*** 1 
    
 
6 CEO Ownership -0.1883*** -0.3379*** 0.1529*** -0.1195*** -0.224*** 1 
   
 
7 Log (Stock Annual Return) -0.0996*** -0.0791*** 0.042** -0.1664*** -0.1474*** 0.1156*** 1 
  
 
8 Log (Market Value of Equity) 0.2258*** 0.0293* 0.373*** 0.3897*** 0.1473*** -0.0582*** -0.3457*** 1 
 
 
9 Market to Book 0.0038 -0.0362** 0.0672*** -0.0176 0.0107 0.0406** -0.0753*** 0.128*** 1 
 
10 Log (Total Assets) 0.2088*** 0.1074*** 0.2004*** 0.4071*** 0.221*** -0.1321*** -0.1971*** 0.7153*** -0.1599*** 
1 
Note: This table reports the Pearson correlation matrix for 3763 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2015. We use natural logarithm of the total 
compensation, salary, option awards, market value of equity and total assets in our analysis. 
*** stands for significant different from zero at 1% level 
** stands for significant different from zero at 5% level 
* stands for significant different from zero at 10% level 
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Table 4 Difference Tests 
 
 
High Transparency Low Transparency t-stat Difference Different of Means (p value) 
Total Compensation 12128.05 9984.45 -7.20 0.000*** 
Salary 1206.11 1038.55 -10.82 0.000*** 
Option Awards 2304.86 2428.92 0.74 0.460 
Stock Annual Return 7.16 8.27 8.02 0.000*** 
Market Value of Equity 47696.35 19171.89 -17.22 0.000*** 
Market to Book 3.52 3.68 1.04 0.296 
Total Assets 91571.21 27661.53 -10.39 0.000*** 
Note: This table reports the mean difference test for 3763 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2015 based on the level of governance transparency.  
*** stands for significant different from zero at 1% level 
** stands for significant different from zero at 5% level 
* stands for significant different from zero at 10% level 
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Table 5  Regression Results 
 
Log (Total Compensation) 
 
Log (Salary) 
 
Log (Option Awards) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Governance Score t-1 0.014**   
0.018*** 
  
-0.007* 
 
 
(0.016) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.094) 
 
Log (Market Value of Equity) t-1 0.143 0.18**  
-0.098 -0.04 
 
0.419*** 0.399*** 
 
(0.103) (0.026) 
 
(0.297) (0.564) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Log (Stock Annual Return) t-1 -0.061 -0.014  
-0.289*** -0.171** 
 
0.366*** 0.336*** 
 
(0.391) (0.837) 
 
(0.005) (0.034) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Market to Book t-1 -0.005 -0.004  
-0.006 -0.001 
 
0.01** 0.009* 
 
(0.208) (0.381) 
 
(0.180) (0.805) 
 
(0.050) (0.053) 
Board Independence 
 
0.003 
  
0.005 
  
-0.001 
  
(0.309) 
  
(0.250) 
  
(0.770) 
CEO Ownership 
 
-0.068* 
  
-0.167*** 
  
0.067*** 
  
(0.055) 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.000) 
Constant 7.372*** 7.318*** 
 
7.933*** 7.53*** 
 
3.59*** 3.574*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
N 3150 3150 
 
3140 3140 
 
2108 2108 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.108 0.133 
 
0.061 0.182 
 
0.34 0.367 
Note: This table reports the Regression test for 3763 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2015. Variables definitions refer to table 1.  *** stands for significant 
different from zero at 1% level, ** stands for significant different from zero at 5% level,  * stands for significant different from zero at 10% level. One year 
lagged data is used for variables including governance score, market value of equity, stock return, and market to book. 
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